ON ZOOLOGICAL NOMENCLATURE. 109 



confounding the name of a species or group with its definition ; and because 

 the former often falls short of the fullness of expression found in the latter, 

 they cancel it without hesitation, and introduce some new term which ap- 

 pears to them more characteristic, but which is utterly unknown to the science, 

 and is therefore devoid of all authority*. If these persons were to object to 

 such names of men as Long, Little, Armstrong, Golightly, &c, in cases where 

 they fail to apply to the individuals who bear them, or should complain of 

 the names Gough, Laiurence, or Harvey, that they were devoid of meaning, 

 and should hence propose to change them for more characteristic appella- 

 tions, they would not act more unphilosophically or inconsiderately than they 

 do in the case before us ; for, in truth, it matters not in the least by what 

 conventional sound we agree to designate an individual object, provided the 

 sign to be employed be stamped with such an authority as will suffice to 

 make it pass current. Now in zoology no one person can subsequently claim 

 an authority equal to that possessed by the person who is the first to define a 

 new genus or describe a new species ; and hence it is that the name origin- 

 ally given, even though it may be inferior in point of elegance or express- 

 iveness to those subsequently proposed, ought as a general principle to be 

 permanently retained. To this consideration we ought to add the injustice 

 of erasing the name originally selected by the person to whose labours we 

 owe our first knowledge of the object ; and we should reflect how much the 

 permission of such a practice opens a door to obscure pretenders for dragging 

 themselves into notice at the expense of original observers. Neither can an 

 author be permitted to alter a name which he himself has once published, 

 except in accordance with fixed and equitable laws. It is well observed by 

 Decandolle, " L'auteur meme qui a le premier etabli un nom n'a pas plus 

 qu'un autre le droit de le changer pour simple cause d'impropriete. La pri- 

 orite en effet est un terme fixe, positif, qui n'admet rien, ni d'arbitraire, ni 

 de partial." 



For these reasons, we have no hesitation in adopting as our fundamental 

 maxim, the " law of priority," viz. 



§ 1. The name originally given by the founder of a group or the 

 describer of a species should be permanently retained, to the exclu- 

 sion of all subsequent synonyms (with the exceptions about to be 

 noticed). 



Having laid down this principle, we must next inquire into the limitations 

 which are found necessary in carrying it into practice. 



[Not to extend to authors older than Linn&us.~\ 

 As our subject matter is strictly confined to the binomial system of nomen- 

 clature, or that which indicates species by means of two Latin words, the one 

 generic, the other specific, and as this invaluable method originated solely 

 with Linnaeus, it is clear that, as far as species are concerned, we ought not 

 to attempt to carry back the principle of priority beyond the date of the 

 12th edition of the ' Systema Naturae.' Previous to that period, naturalists 

 were wont to indicate species not by a name comprised in one word, but 

 by a definition which occupied a sentence, the extreme verbosity of which 

 method was productive of great inconvenience. It is true that one word 

 sometimes sufficed for the definition of a species, but these rare cases were 

 only binomial by accident and not by principle, and ought not therefore in 

 any instance to supersede the binomial designations imposed by Linnaeus. 



* Limifeiis says on this subject, " Ahstinenduni ah hac inuovatione quae nunquaitf cessa- 

 ret, quin indies aptiora detegerentur ad infinitum." 



