514 PROFESSOR ALISON ON THE BELIEF 
a proof of his having mistaken their illustrative language for a metaphysical 
opinion ;’—and when we remember the unparalleled popularity of Dr Brown’s 
Lectures since his death, which has no doubt led many to suppose that he is now 
regarded as the first authority on these subjects in Scotland;—when we find, 
again, Lord JErrrey admitting that “ Dr Rem’s subversion of the ideal system, 
or confutation of that hypothesis which represents the immediate objects of the 
mind in perception as certain images or pictures of external objects conveyed by 
the senses to the sensorium, had been performed with complete success ;” but 
adding “ that after considering the subject with some attention, he has not been 
able to perceive how the destruction of the Ideal Theory can be held as a con- 
futation of those reasonings, which have brought into question the popular 
faith on this subject;” (Zdinburgh Review, vol. iii., p. 281; or Contributions 
to Edinburgh Review, vol. ii., p. 604)—when, on the other hand, we find it stated 
by Sir Winu1am Hamiiton, that Dr Brown is, from first to last, in one and 
all of his strictures on Rem’s doctrine of Perception, wholly in error;” but, 
“ that nevertheless there are ambiguities and inconsistencies of Rem himself, in 
this the most important part of his philosophy, which ought to be exposed, and 
so deprived of their evil influence ;” (Works of Reid, p. 820)—* and, in particular, 
that so far from confuting Idealism, the doctrine of Rem and Stewart affords it 
the best of,all possible foundations ;’ (Works of Reid, p. 820)—and, again, by 
Moret, that although Rerp “ performed an inestimable service to philosophy. 
by shewing that certain simple processes must be viewed as ultimate and primi- 
tive facts in our constitution,—the benefit of which is still to be developed in coming 
eenerations,—yet that the false, or at least inadequate view which he has taken 
of the reflective method in mental philosophy, has caused a want of comprehen- 
siveness as to the legitimate objects or extent of philosophy at large ;” (Morell’s 
Philosophy, vol. ii., p. $1)—I think I have quoted enough to shew, that a general 
distrust of all speculations which led such men to such variety of opinion, and 
despondency as to the possibility of any fixed or useful principles being established, 
by scientific examination of the elementary mental processes to which they referred, 
is not unreasonable. And if, nevertheless, we hold, as I think we ought to do, by 
the maxim, ‘ that when Reason and Philosophy have erred, it is by themselves 
alone that their error can be corrected,”—I trust it will not be deemed a useless 
or unprofitable discussion, to endeavour to shew that when the subject is calmly 
reviewed, and verbal ambiguities as far as possible avoided, there is.really no — 
such difference of opinion among these authors, as will justify the strong expres- 
sions of dissent which I have quoted; but that the differences of opinion are 
either verbal only, or relate to matters ulterior to the main points of controversy, 
which have interested the human mind, in all ages, on this subject ; and, in parti- 
cular, ulterior to those on which it was the object of Rerp and Srewarr to esta- 
blish fixed and satisfactory principles ; and that there are certain general truths 

