516 PROFESSOR ALISON ON THE BELIEF 
intuitive belief, would thus be to reason against reason,—to affirm and deny at 
the same moment,—and to own that the very arguments which we urge are un- 
worthy of being received and credited. 
““ Without some principles of immediate belief, then, it is manifest that we 
could have no belief whatever; for we believe one proposition because we discover 
its relation to some other proposition ; and we must ultimately come to some pri- 
mary proposition, which we admit from the evidence contained in itself, or, to 
speak more accurately, which we believe from the mere impossibility of dishelieving 
wt. All reasoning, then—the most sceptical, be it remarked, as well as the most 
dogmatical—must proceed on some principles which are taken for granted, not be- 
cause we infer them by logical deduction, but because the admission of these first 
principles is a necessary part of our intellectual constitution. 
*“« Every action of our lives is an exemplification of some one or other of these 
truths, as practically felt by us. Why do we believe that what we remember 
truly took place, and that the course of Nature will be in future such as we have 
already observed it? Without the belief of these physical truths, we could not 
exist a day, and yet there is no reasoning from which they can be inferred. 
* These principles of intuitive belief, so necessary for our very existence, and too 
important, therefore, to be left to the casual discovery of Reason, are, as it were, 
an eternal, never-ceasing voice from the Creator and Preserver of our being. The 
reasonings of men, admitted by some and denied by others, have over us but a 
feeble power, which resembles the general frailty of man himself. These internal 
revelations from on high are omnipotent, like their Author. It is zmpossible for 
us to doubt them, because to disbelieve them would be to deny what our very 
constitution was formed to admit.” —(Browny, p. 286.) 
The principle thus stated by Dr Brown, and some of the illustrations of it which 
he has given, seem to me to be worthy of all acceptation; but I beg to ask, how 
do they differ from the fundamental proposition of Dr Rrtp’s Philosophy of Com- 
mon Sense; long previously set forth, for example, in the following passage? If 
there is no essential difference, then I think it clear that Dr Brown ought to have 
distinctly intimated his acquiescence in this, which Dr Rem regarded as the 
cardinal point of his doctrine; and so far, by limiting and defining the province 
of reasoning, and that of simple observation in such inquiries, endeavoured to 
prevent useless labour, and irksome uncertainty, in future students of the same 
science. 
* All reasoning must be from First Principles; and for first principles no other 
reason can be given but this, that, by the constitution of our Nature, we are under 
a necessity of assenting to them. Such principles are parts of our constitution, 
no less than the power of thinking; Reason can neither make nor destroy them, 
nor can it do anything without them. 
“ How, or when, I got such first principles, upon which I build all my rea- 
