
ATTENDING THE EXERCISE OF THE SENSES. 517 
soning, I know not, for I had them before I can remember; but I am sure they 
are parts of my constitution, and that I cannot throw them off. That our thoughts 
and sensations must have a subject, which we call ourself, is not an opinion got 
by reasoning, but a natural principle. That our sensations of touch indicate 
something external, extended, figured, hard or soft, is not a deduction of reason, 
but a natural principle. The belief of it, and the very conception of it, are equally 
parts of our constitution. If we are deceived in it, we are deceived by Him that 
made us, and there is no remedy.”—( Works of Rei, by Sir W. Hamitton, 
p. 130.) 
“ I beg,” he says farther, “to have the honour of making an addition to the 
sceptical system, without which I conceive it cannot hang together. I affirm 
that the belief of the existence of Impressions and Ideas, is as little supported by 
reason, as that of the existence of Minds and Bodies. No man ever did, or ever 
could, offer any reason for this belief. A thorough and consistent sceptic will 
never therefore yield this point; and while he holds it, you can never oblige 
him to yield anything else. 
“ To such a sceptic I have nothing to say; but of the semi-sceptics, I should 
beg to know, why they believe the existence of their own impressions and ideas? 
The true reason I take to be, because they cannot help it; and the same reason 
will lead them to believe many other things.”—(Do., p. 130.) 
In quoting this last passage from Dr Rem, I think it right to say, that notwith- 
standing his distinct assertion here made, and supported by Mr Stewart, that 
the evidence of Consciousness (by which we are informed of the acts of our own 
minds) stands on exactly the same footing as that of Sense, and is equally open 
to the objections of the sceptic, it seems to me that the objection to that state- 
ment, made by several more recent authors, is well founded; because what we 
mean by objects of consciousness are certain changes or events which we feel 
within ourselves, and we cannot, without absurdity, assert, both that such a change 
exists, 7. ¢., that we feel it, and that we doubt its existence, which implies that it 
may not exist. To doubt the evidence of consciousness, therefore, is not merely 
to do violence to our understandings, but is to assert a contradiction in terms. 
This is thus stated by Lord Jerrrey: “ Whatever we doubt, and whatever we 
prove, we must plainly begin with Consciousness. That only is certain—all the 
rest is inference. Our perceptions—not the existence of their objects—are what 
we cannot help believing.” —(Reviem, vol. iii., p. 283.) And the same ground is * 
taken by Sir Wu. Hammiron thus: “There is no scepticism possible touching the 
facts of consciousness in themselves. We cannot doubt that the phenomena of 
consciousness are real, in so far as we are conscious of them, because such doubt, 
being an act of consciousness, would contradict, and consequently annihilate itself: 
but all beyond the mere phenomena of which we are conscious, we may, without 
fear of self-contradiction at least, doubt.”—( Works of Ret, &c., p. 129.) 
VOL. XX. PART IV. 7A 
