522 PROFESSOR ALISON ON THE BELIEF 
by help of the general law of belief in the continuance of the order of Nature, 
which it had not occurred to Rem to connect with it. 
But if there be, as I maintain, this perfect accordance between the principles of 
Dr Rew and the elaborate attempt of Dr Browy, as of other later authors, to analyse 
those operations of mind to which the term Perception has been restricted by both, 
we may be pretty wellassured that any digerence of opinion among those authors, 
on this subject, can be of no great scientific importance; and may very probably 
resolve itself into one of those partial controversies, involving more or less of per- 
sonal jealousy, which, we must admit, have disfigured and retarded most sciences, 
We may next ask, then, how it should happen that Dr Brown should have 
thought himself justified in dwelling at great length on what he called an eatra- 
ordinary mistake made both by Rem and his followers, as to the evidence of 
Sense, and the scepticism of BerKELEY and Hume regarding it?—how he should 
have been led to infer, and been at such pains to prove, that there is no real dif- 
ference between the creed of the sceptic and that of the orthodox philosopher of 
Dr Reiw’s school as to the evidence of sense; and how Sir James MacxinTosa 
should have been led to assert the whole intellectual part of the philosophy of 
Brown to be, by reason of their difference on this very subject, an open revolt 
against the authority of Rr? 
The reason of this is, that both these authors, and other recent writers, as 
it appears to me, certainly misconceived and misrepresented the controversy 
as it was carried on during last century, in several particulars. I do not say 
that there may not have been partial mistakes on the part of Dr Rem, particu- 
larly as to the exact meaning of previous authors,—and certainly there is in his 
writings a diffuseness of style, and frequent repetition of statements which might 
haye been more impressive if more condensed ;—but the chief misapprehensions 
affecting the principles which I have stated, were clearly on the side of Brown. 
I. It wasa palpable misconception on the part both of Dr Brown and Lord Jrr- 
FREY, to attribute to Dr Ret the attempt to prove, by reasoning, the existence 
of the material world, in opposition to the scepticism of previous authors. 
Thus Dr Brown speaks of Ret’s “ supposed proof of the existence of a material 
world,” as quite inadmissible (vol. ii., pp. 50, 51); and Lord Jerrrey speaks of 
his destruction of the Ideal Theory as “having been held as a demonstration of the 
real existence of matter.” —( Edinburgh Revien, vol. iii., p. 281.) Whereas they ought 
to have observed that Rr had, in a few simple but weighty words, disclaimed, as 
expressly as it is possible to conceive, any intention of attempting, or belief in the 
possibility of obtaining, such proof. He says, “ Many eminent philosophers have 
laboured to furnish us with reasons for believing our senses ; but their reasons are 
very insuficient, and will not bear ecxamination.”—(Collected Works, p. 328.) 
“ Man’s knowledge of what really exists, or ever did exist, comes by a channel 
