528 PROFESSOR ALISON ON THE BELIEF 
argument, might be used only metaphorically, as asserted by Dr Brown; and 
his answer to the argument is expressly so stated as to be equally applicable, 
whether the word is used in the literal or the metaphorical sense. His main argu- 
ment is directed, not necessarily against the supposition of intermediate exist- 
ences, called Ideas, but against the supposition that the material world, if it 
exists, must be the eapress image or representation of the mental acts by which 
we are made acquainted with it. 
It will be observed, that there is no absurdity in saying that a Sensation, or 
any other mental act, uniformly attends the impression on any of our organs, 
made by any particular external object or quality, that it indicates to us its ex- 
istence, and suggests to us, or enables us to form, a notion of its nature. The 
absurdity lies only in supposing, that any mental act can be the exact image or 
representation of anything but another mental act, in the same or another mind ; 
and Dr Rem was at pains to point out that his reply to this is independent of 
any particular meaning, and even of the use, of the word Idea. 
He says,—*‘ To prevent mistakes, the reader must be reminded, that if by 
Ideas are meant only the acts or operations of our minds in perceiving, remem- 
bering, or imagining objects, Iam far from calling in question the existence of 
those acts ; we are conscious of them every hour of life, and I believe no man of a 
sound mind ever doubted of their existence.” — (Intellectual Powers, p. 197.) 
This shews that he was aware that the term Ideas might be used metaphori- 
cally, “ or as illustrative language” for acts or states of mind. 
Then he says, in stating his argument against Bishop BerkeLey,—“ That we 
have many Sensations by means of our external senses, there can be no doubt, 
and ifhe is pleased to call these Ideas, there ought to be no dispute about the 
meaning of a word.” ‘ But,” says Bishop BERKELEY, “by our senses we have 
knowledge only of our Sensations or Ideas, call them which you will; and these, 
which are attributes of Mind, can have no resemblance to any qualities of a thing 
which is inanimate. J allow him to call them which he will, but I would have the 
word only in this sentence to be well weighed, because a great deal depends upon it. 
For if it be true that by our senses we have the knowledge of our sensations only, 
then his system must be admitted, and the existence of a material world must be 
given up as a dream.”—(Oollected Works, p. 290.) 
Then he goes on to give the proof, that the mental act in question, however 
rapid, is more complex than it had been represented,—that our minds are so 
constituted as to form uniformly certain definite notions on occasion of certain sensa- 
tions being excited in us,—to draw certain inferences, or pass certain judgments, as 
to the existence and certain qualities of things external to ourselves,—that it is 
to these perceptions that the intuitive belief of independent existence is attached, 
—and that these we at once perceive, when our attention is fixed on them, to be es- 
sentially distinct from the sensations, and to resemble them in no particular. This per- 
