
. 
we 
ATTENDING THE EXERCISE OF THE SENSES. 533 
means only “that simpler and more refined Idealism, which views in ideas only 
modifications of the mind itself,” 7. ¢., only what Dr Brown, in one passage 
already quoted, regarded the ideas of BERKELEY, Viz., as a metaphorical way of 
expressing acts or states of the mind; in which sense Dr Rerp, as we have 
already seen, said he did not object to the use of the term, although he preferred 
another phraseology ; and using it in that sense, we have seen that his argument 
against HumME and BERKELEY is independent of any objection to the term. 
Dr Rei goes no farther in explaining the manner in which we acquire the 
knowledge of extension or space, than to say, that it is a Perception, or a notion 
suggested to the mind by certain of our sensations, distinctly formed in the 
mind, and in which, when we analyse it as minutely as we can, we find the be- 
lief of external independent existence to be an essential element. Sir WiLL1am 
HamiuTon considers the conception of Space to be a native form, or necessary con- 
dition of thought; but that we have an immediate perception of something ex- 
tended, 7. ¢., invested with this quality, and which is independent of us. (See 
Notes to pages 126 and 324 of Collected Works, Sc.) 
I cannot perceive that there is anything more than a verbal distinction be- 
tween these forms of expression; but if there be a real improvement in the latter 
form, it seems to me that it is sufficiently provided for by Dr Rem’s admission, 
that a finer eye may trace the labyrinth farther than he has done; but that in 
the meantime “there is no harm done” in resting on the position of Rep as to 
that belief; and acquiescing in his reflection, that ‘‘if we are deceived in it, we are 
deceived by Him that made us, and there is no remedy.” 
It is stated by Morett, and I believe is the opinion of others who have made 
a study of recent German works on metaphysics, that the works of Dr Rem and 
all other Scotch metaphysicians, although accurate, so far as theygo, in “ inves- 
tigating and classifying the more obvious phenomena of the mind, as they 
appear in the individual, are deficient in not having gone a step farther, and dis- 
covered the very laws of our mental constitution, on which our primitive beliefs 
rest; that they might have sought the groundwork of our universal notions in 
the depths of our own being, and thus referred all the principles of common 
sense, all the primary laws of belief, back to their source in the subjective forms 
of the understanding and the reason (Historical and Critical View, §e., vol. ii., 
p. 64); that in investigating the mental phenomena, our object should be to 
discover, not merely the reality of certain principles, but their necessity,—not 
merely the law of operation, but the reason of that law” (Ditto, p. 53); and that 
this is to be done, not by mere induction, but “by scanning the contents of our 
consciousness by the power of reflection, whereby we are enabled to catch the 
very forms of our inward activity.”—(P. 52.) 
In forming this opinion, I cannot help thinking that this very learned and 
estimable author has deceived himself; and that no such advance has been made 
VOL. XX. PART IV. VE 
