534 PROFESSOR ALISON ON THE BELIEF 
since the time of Srewarr and Brown, either in the mode of inquiry, or in the 
results of inquiry on the subject. But all that I wish to observe on that point is 
this, that those speculations avowedly relate to subjects ulterior to those on 
which Rem and Srewarr exerted their minds; that they do not stand opposed to 
the doctrines of Reip or Stewart as to the exercise of the senses, and the mental 
acts thence resulting, but are regarded as an addition to these doctrines; and 
therefore, that, whether admitted or rejected, they ought not to interfere with our 
appreciation of the truth or importance of the principles regarding our mental 
constitution, which they had laid down, and which these authors substantially 
approve. 
In particular, while I cannot but admire the sublimity of the Theological in- 
ferences which Morett has stated as resulting from the study of the Mind as he 
directs it, I cannot think it necessary to go farther into the subject than Rew and 
Srewart had done, in order to draw from it inferences as satisfactory to the in- 
tellect, and as consoling to the heart of man, as can be drawn from any unassisted 
human contemplation or reflection. 
It is stated, indeed, by More xt, that the great argument of Natural Theology, 
drawn from the observed adaptation of means to ends,—of which Imay observe, that 
the principle of the adaptation of the construction of animals to the conditions of their 
ewistence, so well illustrated since their time by Cuvier, Owen, and their follow- 
ers, is distinctly an example,—has been well set forth by all the Scottish School 
of Metaphysicians, from Rep to CuaLmMers; but that two subjects connected with 
it ought to have been taken up more fully, viz., 1st, the origin of the idea of Ab- 
solute Power, or of the Divinity in the mind; and, 2/, the relation of the Divine 
Power, or Energy, to Man on the one hand, and to Nature on the other.—(Modern 
Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 71.) The first of these, I think, may really be regarded as 
a defect in the philosophy of Dr Brown, who rested the great argument of Na- 
tural Theology eaclusively on the observed adaptation of means to ends;—and 
did not admit as a part of that argument, the formation of the notion of Efficient 
Cause, as distinguished by Rerp and Stewart from Physical Cause ;—and that it 
was a defect seems to me distinctly shewn byan observation of his own, which 
I cannot reconcile with the doctrine which he had laid down on this subject. 
The passage to which I allude is that where he speculates, with his usual 
eloquence and fancy, on the emotions which would be excited in the human race 
if it were possible that they should come to maturity in a world of darkness, and 
the sun were then suddenly to arise on their sight. ‘“ The very atheists of sucha 
world,” he says, “ would confess that there is a Power that can create.” Now he 
surely could not have maintained that this instantaneous inference would imply a 
process of reasoning, by which the supposed atheists might satisfy themselves that 
some particular object was in view, which could only be attained by an influence 
of the sun, and therefore saw in this sudden and striking change an adaptation of 
I a ee 
ae 
> « 
