533 
The first head of this division might be regarded as coin- 
cident with those mental operations commonly included under 
the term imagination, which he would occasionally use, as a 
convenient term, and of familiar use. 
The author next proceeded to show that, as the ideas he 
had described were essentially those of sensible properties, it 
must be a consequence that their combination must be sensi- 
ble associations, and therefore affecting the mind, in whatever 
degree, in the same manner as the sensible presence of such 
objects, had they any real or external existence. Such effects 
would be very indistinct in some (probably in most) minds, 
and very intense in others. It would be apparent from these 
considerations, that in one class of writers, or artists, the mind 
constructs a combination by mere rules, and in another from a - 
distinct and sensible conception ; and further, that in the ana- 
lysis of writings or works of art, some indications might be 
discoverable of these two different modes of operation. 
There was also another consideration, which, though 
seemingly leading to a difficulty, would very much tend to aid 
in the clear exemplification of this process. Its nature being 
to produce effects similar to the known effects of present reality, 
may be traced more clearly by comparison with them, The 
author would, he said, avail himself of this inference as a 
means of illustration. 
He then proceeded to cite various examples from standard 
poets, in which he traced the indications of distinct presence, 
or conception of presence, which he severally contrasted with 
conjectural cases of the opposite mode of artistic construction, 
without those conceptions. . 
The author next proceeded to notice other kinds of exam- 
ples in the conception of characters, events, and in translation 
of the thoughts of others, in which he showed that the differ- 
ence of language could frequently be only remedied by equi- 
valents supplied by the aid of the original conception. — 
