120 FRAGMENT OF AN INTENDED ACCOUNT 



off the Cheasapeak in 1781. In most of these actions, though 

 conducted by some of our ablest naval officers, the British fleet 

 being to windward, by extending the line of battle, with a de- 

 sign of disabling or destroying the whole of the enemy's line 

 to leeward, was itself disabled before the ships could reach a 

 situation in which they could annoy the enemy ; while, on the 

 other hand, the French, perceiving the British ships in disor- 

 der, have made sail, and, after throwing in their whole fire, 

 have formed a line to leeward, where they lay prepared for 

 another attack ; and thus has been frustrated that combination 

 of skill and courage which distinguishes our seamen, and has 

 always been so conspicuous in actions of single ships. The 

 analysis of those actions forms a most interesting part of Mr 

 Clerk's book, and furnishes a commentary on the naval histo- 

 ry of Britain, such as we seek for in vain in the treatises writ- 

 ten expressly on that subject. 



In the second part of his work, which, though first written, 

 was last published, the author has considered the nature of the 

 attack from the leeward, or where the fleet which would force 

 the other to action has not the advantage of the weather-gage. 

 Here also he proves, by arguments very clear and convincing, 

 that nothing promises success but the cutting of the enemy's 

 line in two ; the leeward fleet on the opposite tack to that of 

 the enemy, bearing up obliquely, so as to pierce the line in 

 the centre, or towards the rear, as circumstances may direct. 

 The ships thus cut off could have no support, and must either 

 save themselves by downright flight, or fall into the hands of 

 the enemy. 



The time when Mr Clerk was engaged in these specula- 

 tions, was a period very memorable in the naval, the military, 

 and political history of this country; and never was there a 

 moment when the communication of the secret he had disco- 

 vered 



