400 • OBSERVATIONS ON THE 



ciples and the earliest history of human thought have not 

 met with adequate success. The origin of thought and 

 the origin of language form distinct subjects of inquiry, the 

 difference betwixt the eras that belon<j to them not bein<j 

 accidental but essential. There is nothing in the general 

 nature of the thinking faculty of man that implies a prone- 

 ness to communicate his thoughts to others. His inclina- 

 tion to speak to his neighbour is not the consequence of 

 the simple existence of thought, but arises from a particular 

 kind of thoughts which occupy his mind. His motives for 

 employing any sort of language are to be found in the mu- 

 tual relations subsisting among the species. The ideas re- 

 ceived from inanimate nature might exist in full vigour, and 

 the sensations of pleasure and pain might be varied and lively, 

 and yet never lead to the employment of language. Before 

 language can have existence, a man must perceive that he is 

 surrounded by other sentient beings ; he must know that some 

 analogy subsists betwixt their perceptions and his own ; he 

 must be acquainted with the principles of mutual attention and 

 imitation, which characterise human nature ; and, he must 

 know that it is practicable to influence the thoughts of others 

 by means of signs. After possessing all this knowledge, he 

 must, before he can use language, feel the influence of some 

 particular motive. These circumstances not only enter into the 

 first contrivance of language, but perpetually accompany the 

 employment of it. 



In speaking to our neighbour, we employ a certain power of 

 which we find ourselves possessed to rouse his thoughts from 

 a state of inaction, or to direct them to objects different from 

 those which have previously engaged them. The exercise of 

 this power is properly an imperative act, and the original and 

 jmost nabural expression of it, is in the Imperative mood of the 



verb. 



