Account of 
Dr Smith. 
68 HISTORY of the SOCIETY. 
out rejecting entirely Mr Hume’s dodtrine, propofes another of 
his own, far more comprehenfive; a doétrine with which he 
thinks all the moft celebrated theories of morality invented by 
his predeceffors coincide in part, and from fome partial view 
of which he apprehends that they have all proceeded. 
Or this very ingenious and original theory, I fhall endeavour 
to give a fhort abftra@. To thofe who are familiarly acquaint- 
ed with it as it is ftated by its Author, I am aware that the at- 
tempt may appear fuperfluous ; but I flatter myfelf that it will 
not be wholly ufelefs to fuch as have not been much cunverfant 
in thefe abftract difquifitions, by prefenting to them the lead- 
ing principles of the fyftem in one connected view, without 
thofe interruptions of the attention which neceflarily arife from 
the Author’s various and happy illuftrations, and from the 
many eloquent digreflions which animate and adorn his compo- 
fition. 
Tue fundamental principle of Mr Smiru’s theory is, that the 
primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of 
other men; and that our moral judgments with refpe¢t to our 
own condué are only applications to ourfelves of decifions 
which we have already paffed on the conduc of our neigh- 
bour. His work accordingly confifts of two parts. In the 
former, he explains in what manner we learn to judge of the 
conduét of our neighbour; in the latter, in what manner, 
by applying thefe judgments to ourfelves, we acquire a /enfe - 
of duty. 
Our moral judgments, both with refpe& to our own conduct 
and that of others, include two diftinét perceptions: /ix/f, A 
perception of conduét as right or wrong ; and, /econdly, A per- 
ception of the merit or demerit of the agent. To that quality 
of conduct which moralifts, in general, exprefs by the word 
ReAitude, Mr Smiru gives the name of Propriety ; and he be- 
gins 
