Account of 
Dr Sniith, 
74 HISTORY of th SOCIETY. 
and demerit; which he thinks has alfo a reference, in the firft in- 
ftance, not to our own characters, but to'the characters of our 
neighbours. In explaining the origin of this part of our mo- 
ral conftitution, he avails himfelf of the fame principle of fympa- 
thy, into which he refolves the fentiment of moral approbation. 
Tue words propriety and impropriety; when applied to an af- 
fetion of the mind, are ufed in this theory (as has been al- 
ready obferved) to exprefs the fuitablenefs or unfuitablenefs of 
the affection to its exciting cau/e. The words merit and demerit 
have always a reference (according to Mr Smit) to the effect 
which the affection tends to produce. When the tendency of 
an affection is beneficial, the agent appears to us a proper ob- 
jeét of reward ; when it is hurtful, he appears the proper objec 
of punifhment. 
Tue principles in our nature which moft directly prompt us 
to reward and to punifh, are gratitude and refentment. To fay 
of a perfon, therefore, that he is deferving of reward or of pu- 
nifhment,. is to fay, in other words, that he is a proper objec of 
gratitude or of refentment; or, which amounts to the fame 
thing, that he is to fome perfon or perfons the object of a gra- 
titude or of a refentment, which every reafonable man is ready 
to adopt and fympathize with. 
Ir is however very neceflary to obferve, that we do not tho- 
roughly fympathize with the gratirude of one man towards 
another, merely becaufe this other has been the caufe of his 
good fortune, unlefs he has been the caufe of it from motives 
which we entirely go along with. Our fenfe, therefore, of the 
good defert of an action, is a compounded fentiment, made up 
of an indirect fympathy with the perfon to whom the action is 
beneficial, and of a direct fympathy with the affections and 
motives of the agent.——The fame remark applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to our fenfe of demerit, or of ill-defert. 
From thefe principles, it is inferred, that the only aétions 
which appear to us deferving of reward, are actions of a bene- 
ficial 
