WA“POP. Ex NoD I. Xx, St 
tion in any action or character conftitutes, according to Mr 
Hume, the fentiment of moral approbation. That no quali- 
ties of the mind are approved of as virtuous, but fuch as are 
ufeful or agreeable, either to the perfon himfelf or to others, he 
admits to be a propofition that holds univerfally ; and he alfo 
admits, that the fentiment of approbation with which we re- 
gard virtue, is'enlivened by the perception of this utility, or, 
as he explains the fact, it is enlivened by our fympathy with 
the happinefs of thofe to whom the utility extends : But {till he 
infifts, that it is not the view of this utility which is either the 
firft or principal fource of moral approbation. 
To fum up the whole of his do&rine in a few words. 
‘* When we approve of any character or action, the fentiments 
“ which we feel are derived from four different fources.  Firft, 
we fympathize with the motives of the agent; fecondly, we 
enter into the gratitude of thofe who receive the benefit of 
* his actions ; thirdly, we obferve that his condué&t has been 
‘* agreeable to the general rules by which thofe two fympathies 
generally act ; and, laftly, when we confider fuch aétions as 
making a part of ady{tem of behaviour which tends to pro- 
mote the happinefs, either of the individual or of fociety, 
they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not un- 
like that which we afcribe to any well-contrived machine.” 
Thefe different fentiments, he thinks, exhauft completely, in 
every inftance that can be fuppofed, the compounded fentiment 
of moral approbation. “ After deducting, fays he, in any one 
“ particular cafe, all that muft be acknowledged to proceed 
from fome one or other of thefe four principles, I fhould be 
_overplus to be afcribed to a moral fenfe, or to any other pe- 
culiar faculty, provided any body will afcertain precifely what 
this overplus is.” 
pMObe TMs yslqisecing ait ; (L)i. - Mr 
4< 
ae 
glad to know what remains; and 1. {hall freely allow this: 
Accolint of 
Dr Sziith, 
