98 On th UTILITY of defining 
fays, ““ Nemo.tam audax qui po/ceret, nemo tam impudens qui 
pofularet *.” The pointed oppofition made here by the ora- 
tor between the two verbs, fhews clearly the meaning affixed 
by him to each. Impudence, he tells us in the lat claufe, or 
a contempt for the opinion of the world, who would judge as 
to the propriety of the demand, is all that would be needful 
for enabling the petitioner to prefent it in the form denoted by 
paftulare. With regard to po/cere, however, the cafe is different. 
A fentiment of courage is fuppofed needful, when a petition, 
implying the violation of fome private right, was to be prefent- 
ed. A matter of favour would, with an ‘unbecoming boldnefs,, 
have been held forth as a matter of right, fo that the perfon 
requefted might reject the petition, as being an infult to him- 
felf. 
THE definition given by Varro of pofcere feems ‘perfectly. 
juft, except only in as far as a compound is prepofteroufly 
taken to ftate the power of the verb itfelf. “ Po/cere,” fays 
he, “‘ eft quoties aliquid pro merito noftro depofcimus f.”" Had 
the critic taken the trouble previoufly to define ‘* depofcere,”’ 
we fhould have been at no lofs to underftand his account of 
the fimple verb. His definition appears to be, in other refpeéts, 
complete, as he fuppofes the petitioner poflefled of be power 
of meafuring the extent of what he ftyles “ :meritum.” 
Tue different ufes of the verb pofcere may be all reconciled 
with the definition now given, when it is applied to the inter- 
courfe that takes place between man and man. In its applica- 
tion, however, to thofe petitions that were prefented by the an- 
cients to their’ gods, its power becomes more myfterious. The. 
idea of right is not‘eafily reconciled: with that of fupplication ; 
fo'that, according to the definition given’ of the verb, thofe 
who were faid pofcere.deos veniam, might well ‘be accufed of 
profanenefs. 
In 
* Cic, in Ver. 4.44: ) ' + Serv. /En, 9. 193 
