CONSCIOUSNESS AND PAIN 65 



that plants also feel ? I venture to say that 

 they do feel, and that the mandrake, or any 

 other plant, is really hurt when pulled forcibl}^ 

 from the ground, suffering its modicum of 

 pain, although unaccompanied by signs that 

 make the fact patent to our senses. If a plant 

 can feel a bodiU^ hurt, it must necessarily pos- 

 sess consciousness, for pain without conscious- 

 ness is inconceivable. Hence the thesis : all 

 living organisms, whether animal or plant, 

 arecapable of conscious pain to a degree com- 

 mensurate with the requirements of their 

 nature. 



At the outset it must be clearly reco2:nized ti„ . <• 



•^ ^ Meaning oi 



that the word consciousness, as used in this 

 connection, contains no reference to self-con- 

 sciousness, which implies introspection. Self- 

 consciousness, it may be said in passing, is 

 necessary that the individual may, for in- 

 stance, be aw^are of its own identity, or may 

 reflect upon a given sensation, which powers 

 belong, undoubtedly, not to all classes of be- 

 ings, but only to the more highly organized, 

 and especially to those with a centralized ner- 

 vous system. 



General consciousness, on the other hand, 

 implies a recognition of the impact of stimuli; 

 the individual knows that the uniformit\^ of 

 the conditions of its existence is disturbed, 

 sometimes pleasurabh^ sometimes painfull\^ 



consciousness 



