CONSCIOUSNESS AND PAIN 69 



pleasure, pain, etc., in some of their several 

 legitimate meanings, which are not, however, 

 those suitable for the topic, and ignoring the 

 meanings which alone can lead to clear no- 

 tions. To show the diversit\^ of usage in em- 

 ploying the word "feeling" I will quote Ward 

 in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (xx, 40), 

 who observes that "it is plain that further 

 definition is requisite for a word that may 

 mean (1) a touch, as /ee/j/^o" of roughness, (2) 

 an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger, (3) 

 an emotion, as feeling of anger, (4) feeling 

 proper, as pleasure or pain." It is in this last 

 sense only that I wish to emplo3^ it. And it 

 is well to bear in mind in the same connec- 

 tion, that in simple organisms, feeling, like 

 other functions, \\\\\ have but a simple and 

 feeble development, while in complex beings, 

 it will take on a diversity commensurate with 

 the degree of organic attainment, preserving, 

 however, throughout the whole gamut of var- 

 iation, the same fundamental quality of 

 ph\^sical pain and pleasure. 



No less diversity exists as to the use of the 

 terms pain and pleasure. In a recent volume 

 on the subject (Marshall: Pain, pleasure cind 

 aesthetics, 1894, p. 169) I find it stated that 

 the "activity of the organ of any content if 

 efficient is pleasurable, if inefficient is pain- 

 ful," which is nearly in accord with the 



