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But the expedlation, in the fame circumftances of an event, 

 will be different according to the conftitution of the expectant ; 

 for, according to his antecedent experience, knowledge, pre- 

 judices, and palfions, the argunaents for or againft the proba- 

 bility of the event will appear more or lefs numerous, more or 

 lefs cogent; fo that in given circumftances of an expefled event, 

 or of a propofed argument, the apparent probability will very 

 much depend on the conftitution of the individual, which there- 

 fore muft be confidered as a principal element in the compu- * 

 tation. 



In like manner, in the courfe of nature, we conclude, by ex- 

 perience, from things paft to the future ; and when the analogy 

 Is properly inftituted, the events feldom or never differ; the 

 more the preceding qualities are which agree, the greater on 

 that account is the probability that the events will be the fame : 

 and from greater experience we gradually conclude a greater 

 degree of probability, though, in general, we cannot allign a 

 reafon for it. Deinde nee illud quenquam latere poteft, fays 

 Bernouilli, quod ad judicandum hoc modo (ncmpe empirico) de 

 quopiam cventu, non fufficiat fumpfilTe unum alterumque experi- 

 mentum, fed quod magna experimcntorum requiratur copia; 

 quando & ftupidifruuus quifque, ne/cio quo naturae inftlnBu, per 

 fe & ntilld prcevid injiitutione (quod fane mirabih eji) corapertum 

 habet, quo plures ejufmodi captse fuerint obfervationes, eo minus 

 a fcopo aberrandi periculum fore. Ars Conjedandi, pag. 225. 



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