[ 9.5 ] 



on the number of trials which we have refpedtively made with 

 refpedt to them. 



It is true that Mr. Price, in his Ellay on Miracles, p. 391, 

 feems to think, that our expecflation of the future from the paft. 

 is not to be refolved into the conftitution of our nature, but to 

 knowledge ; and this knowledge he feems to think is intuitive. 

 " If," fays he, " out of a wheel, the particular contents of which 

 *' I am ignorant of, I fhould draw a white paper a hundred 

 " times together, I fhould fee that it was probable^ that it had 

 " more white papers than black, and therefore fhould expedite 

 " draw a white paper the next trial." But here Mr. Price feems, 

 unknowingly, to maintain the principle which he controverts ; . 

 for we perceive the truth of axioms intuitively, either by the 

 conftitution of our nature, or by afTociation which is refolvable 

 into it; and fince we perceive the probability of propofitions 

 refpedling exiflence, as he alTerts, in the fame manner, it follows 

 that we muft perceive this probability likewife, either by the con- 

 flitution of our nature, or by an afTociation which is refolvable 

 into it. In fa(5l, all probable propofitions muft be fo either be- 

 caufe they are the conclufions of fyllogifms, one of whofe pre- 

 mifes at leaft is probable, or becaufe they are primitive probable 

 propofitions. That there muft be fuch primitive, probable pro- 

 pofitions, is evident, when we confider that if a propofition is pro- 

 bable only becaufe it is deduced from premlfcs, one of which- 

 at leaft is probable, then this premife muft likewife be probable 



for: 



