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for the fame rcafon ; and thus there would be a procefs ad in- 

 finitum, which is abfurd. Thefe primitive probable propofitions 

 are thofe only which are the inferences we make of future events 

 from the paft. That thefe inferences are not certain is admitted ; 

 that they are alfo primitive inferences is manifeft, becaufe there 

 is' no medium by which the inference is made out. There are 

 therefore original and primitive probable propofitions, in the 

 fame manner as there arc original and primitive certain propo- 

 fitions, which are called axioms. But to afcribe the former to 

 intuitive knowledge feems an abufe of language, intuition having 

 been univerfally confined to the perception of axiomatical 

 truths. 



I KNOW it has alfo been maintained by fome Metaphyficians, 

 that teftimony does not derive its evidence from experience ; but 

 that it has a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent 

 to experience. Let us then proceed to examine the arguments 

 by which they endeavour to eftablifli this pofition. 



First, it is to be remarked, fays Mr. Campbell, that the earlieft 

 affent, which is given to teftimony by children, and which is 

 previous to all experience, is in fadl the moft unlimited ; that by 

 a gradual experience of mankind, it is gradually contra6led, and 

 reduced to narrower bounds. To fay therefore, that our dijffidence 

 in. teftimony is the refult of experience, is more philofophical, 



becaufe 



