r ^°° ] 



of the witnefs. sdly. Concurrent teftimony is not juflly intro- 

 duced into this argument by Mr. Price, becaufe the foundation 

 of the evidence of difcrete teflimony mufl be afcertained, before 

 we can proceed to the eflimation of concurrent teftimony ; and alfo, 

 more particularly, becaufe the greater ftrength of concurrent 

 teftimony is equally admitted both by thofe who deny the depen- 

 dence of the regard we pay to teftimony on experience, and thofe 

 who aflfert it. 4thly, In our experience of a courfe of nature, 

 our convidlion is not always in proportion to the number of ex- 

 periments in a give?i mflance, though it is in proportion to the whole 

 number of experiments on which our belief is founded : thus if a 

 new metal be difcovered which is fpecifically heavier than lead, we 

 conclude from that fingle experiment that it will fink in water, with 

 a confidence as great as that lead itfelf, on which we have made fo 

 many experiments, will fink in water. And the reafon of this is, be- 

 caufe we transfer to this particular inftance the fum of our expe- 

 riments on other fubftances fpecifically heavier than water, which 

 have always been obferved to fink in it. And in-tliis way 

 it is, that the regard we pay to the report of a witnefs, is not 

 always in propo.tion to the number of inflances in"which^ v\'e 

 have found that he has told truth, namely becaufe we apply to 

 him the fum of all thofe indications of veracity, which in pre- 

 vious infiances we have obferved in others. 



4thly, M.i. Price obferves, that we feel in ourfelves that a re- 

 gard to truth is one principle in human nature ; and we know, 

 that there muft be fucH a principle In every reafonable being. 



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