\ 



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manner on the number of experiments either adually made by 



ourfelveS or reported by others, we will fuppofe it — . This ar- 



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gument is founded on an analogy which has never deceived us, 

 and is called, by Mr. Hume, a proof. On the other hand, there 

 is a diredl and pofitive teftimony of a fingle witncfs, that the 

 contradidtory of this event did adlually happen ; and this is fuch 

 a teftimony as both perfonal and derived experience aflures us 

 has never deceived ; the probability of the truth of this tefl:imony 



we will call ; this argument Mr. Hume likewife calls a proof, 



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and he fuppofes, that it is equal to the former, that is, 



= This however is a mere hypothefis : for they are 



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both probable inferences only, deduced from experience ; but it 

 is by no means Ihewn, that the number of experiments made in 

 both cafes are the fame, or the circumftances exadtly parallel ; / 

 therefore may be either equal to, or greater, or lefs than ^, in any 

 afligned proportion. The evidence of a fingle witnefs is to be com- 

 pared with that probability of an event in phyfical phosnomcna, 

 which is derived from a feries of fimilar experiments only ; be- 

 caufe the veracity of human teftimony conftitutes one fpecics of 

 events in the courfc of nature, in the fame manner as the finking 

 of lead in water, or the diiTolution of gold in aqua regia j and 

 therefore is deduced, in the fame manner as any other fpecific 



P 2 phoenomenon, 



