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Laftly, That is faid to be morally neceffary whofe non- 

 exiftence is contrary to the laws by which moral agents con- 

 ftantly and univerfally govern their condudl. On the other 

 hand we call that future objed certain, which will not fail to 

 come to pafs. 



4. Hence certainty differs from neceffity in this, that what 

 is neceflary cannot, and what is certain -wiU not, fail to happen. 

 What is neceffary is certain, but not vice verfa. 



5. A power is faid to be free when its exercife in every fenfe 

 is morally poflible. 



6. Will or the power or faculty of 'uoiUing is faid to be free, when 

 it may ac^ or not ad, or eleEl, without the conftraint of moral 

 neceffity; for no other can be applied to the will. The applica- 

 tion of this definition reqviires fome farther obfervations. 



7. I ft, We muft obferve, that the will can form no volition, 

 but with a view of obtaining fome good either real or apparent. 

 For all rational agents necejfarily covet happinefs, and efteem that 

 to be good which promotes or conflitutes any degree of happi- 

 nefs, and confequently purfue it, with an ardour proportioned 

 to the degree it expofes to their view. A volition like every 

 adion requires a fufEcient reafon for its exiflence, and iu this 



cafe 



