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cafe none can be adduced but the attainment of fome de^'ee of 

 happinefs. The good or advantage thus held forth to the mind 

 is called the motive or final caufe of its ad:ion. But the efficient 

 caufe of the volition is the mind itfelf ; the term motive is in 

 fome degree improper as it conveys the idea of adtivity, whereas 

 it is in reality paflive, being the term towards which the mind 

 moves, or from which it recedes. 



8. 2d, As the will can never adl without a motive, the con- 

 nexion between a volition and fome motive is metaphyfically 

 neceffary, it being grounded on the very nature of the mind, 

 or of an intelligent agent, which cannot adl but with a view of 

 obtaining happinefs. But with refpedl to particular motives the 

 following diftindlions are to be obferved : 



t 



9. If the good prefented to the mind be apparently infinite, its 

 connexion with a correfpondent volition is then morally neceflary, 

 but if the good prefented htji?tite, the connexion muft be weaker ; 

 but ftill, as it is no lefs real fince it exifts, it is certain. 



Note — Certainty is an ambiguous term, as it fometimes de- 

 notes the i-eality of an objedl, fometimes the foundation or caufe 

 of that reality, and fometimes the firm perfuafion of the mind 

 of the reality of an objecfl. Here it is employed in the firft 

 fenfe, and fometimes in the fecond, but never iu the laft. In 



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