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the firfl fenfe it is oppofed to unreality, or non-txijlence^ in the 

 third, it is oppofed to uncertainty or mere probability. 



10. Necessity and contingency are oppofed to each other, 

 as corringency denotes the mere pofTible exiftence or non- 

 exiflence of an objecfl in any future time, but the oppolite of 

 certainty is unreality. 



11. Hence we may obferve a gradation in the ftrength of-' 

 the tendency of the mind towards the motives that are prefented 

 to it from that which is infinitely flrong. and therefore produces 

 a moral nccejpty, to that which is indefinitely weak, but whofe 

 connexion with volition is nevcrthelef, certain. To attribute a 

 purfuit equally flrong to motives of apparently unequal appe- 

 tibility is evidently abfurd, yet this the neccllitarians are forced to 

 maintain, as neceflity admits of no degrees. The ftrength or 

 force of motives, or more properly fpeaking their appetibility, 

 evidently refults from the degree of apparent good which they 

 prefent. 



12. But it may be replied that neither can reality admit of 

 different degrees, nor confequently can certainty. This is true 

 with refpeft to the firft fenfe, but not with refpedl to the fecond 

 fenfe of that word. For the foundation of certainty is fo much 

 the flronger as it approaches more to neceflity. 



13. If 



