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13- ^F ends or motives, apparently equally defirable, but fuggeft- 

 ing different or oppofite volitions, be prefented to the mind, and 

 if both prefent a greater good than that refulting from remain- 

 ing in its acflual ftate by embracing neither, in that cafe the 

 mind may tend to either, that is, may form a volition to obtain 

 the good prefented by either. For though there is no reafon for 

 preferring either, yet the good prefented by each is a fuiEcient 

 reafon for purfuing that prefented by any of them, and the im- 

 poflibility of purfuing both is a fufEcient reafon for purfuing 

 one of them. Yet probably fome extrinfic reafon generally fug- 

 gefts the choice, fuch as that one of them was firll thought of, 

 or laft thought of, &c. 



14. If motives, apparently unequally dejirable^ be prefented to the 

 mind, then if the inequality be infinite the mind will necejfarily 

 purfue the moft defirable for the reafons already given. 



15. If the inequality ht Jinite^ it frequently happens that by 

 confidering them in different points of view their appetibility 

 may be inverted, the mojl defirable being in fome refpeds the 

 leafl fo, and the leafl defirable appearing in fome lights the mojl 



fo. Hence the mind is free to purfue either from the intrinfic good 

 each holds to its view. 



16. This 



