[ 3" ] 



fentially a(^ive. Thus motives feem to imply fomething adllve, 

 whereas they are in reality paffive, being the ends which the 

 mind purfues or may purfue. They are faid to impel the mind 

 to adlion, which again falfely denotes adlivity, whereas the mind 

 mtursXlj purfues them in proportion to the apparent good they 

 prefene. Thus alfo force and Jlrength are improperly applied to 

 them. 



I SHALL now proceed to obviate the objedlions to human liberty 

 advanced by Dr. Prieflley, who of all others has ftated them with 

 moft clearnefs and precifion, occafionally noticing any thing far- 

 ther relevant to the fubjedl that has been advanced by other 

 writers. 



The Dodlor, in p. 7 of his Illuftrations of Philofophical Necef- 

 fity, tells us, " ihat the liberty he denies to man is that of do- 

 " ing feveral things, when all the previous circumflances (in- 

 " eluding xhtjiate of his mind and his tnews of things) are precife- 

 " ly the fame ; and aflerts, that in the fame precife ftate of mind, 

 " and with the fame views of things, he would always voluntari- 

 " ly make the fame choice and come to the fame determina- 

 " tion." 



By views of things the Doftor evidently means motives, and 

 confequently in feme cafes, namely, thofe mentioned in Nos. 9 



and 



