[ 3^2 ] 



and 14, his afTertion is perfetflly jufl:, the motive being there fup- 

 pofed to be infinitely defireable, but in mofl cafes, as thofe 

 mentioned in Nos. 13 and 15, it may be true, and it may alfo be 

 falfe ; for as in thofe cafes the reafons for oppofite determinations 

 are apparently equal, the mind may at one time form one choice 

 and at another time another, or it may always form the fame, or 

 each time a different. * 



The Dodlor alfo fays, " he allows to man the liberty of doing 

 " whatever he pleafes," but the liberty here meant is not the li- 

 berty of performing any external acflion, but the liberty of will- 

 ing or chufing. 



Mr. Locke feems to think that the will cannot properly be 

 fi^id to be free, becaufe liberty (he fays) " is but a power belong- 

 " ing to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of 

 " will which is alfo a power ;" but liberty is not merely a power 

 but a fpecies of power, as power may be exerted either neceffarily 

 or freely. 



To eftablifh his conclufion, Dr. Prieftley lays down fome obfer- 

 vations relative to caufe and effed. which being folely applicable 

 to corporeal nature, I omit. He then tells us, p. 1 3, " that a 

 " particular determination of the mind could not be otherwife 

 " than it was, if the laws of nature be fuch as that the fame de- 



" termination 



