[ 203 ] 



This clafs has been illviftrated only by a mathematical ex- 

 ample ; and I believe that it would be difficult to produce an 

 inftance of complete demonftrative certainty, containing any 

 thing more than verbal information, which belonged to any 

 other department of human knowledge *. Locke was indeed 

 defirous of convincing his readers that morality was capable of 

 demonftration ; but he does not appear to have eftablifhed this 

 favourite principle. He has fpoken in general of our relation 

 towards God as a foundation on which moral rules might be 

 built ; but even though mankind fliould agree in the principle 

 of obligation, a fubje(5l which has wearied and exhaufted con- 

 troverfy, the detail of moral duties mufl: neceffarily involve a 

 complicated conlideration of the motives and confequences of 

 human adlions, that is, of the operation of phyfical and moral 

 caufes. This principle then, though admitted, would be of 

 little importance unlefs the operation of caufes were within 

 our cognizance. He has not been more fuccefsful in his ex- 

 amples than in his general obfervations. Where there is no 

 property there is no injiiftice, and. No government allows abfoltite 

 liberty, are, as Paley has already obferved, merely verbal pro- 

 pofitions 5 for the notion of injuflice fuppofes the exiftence of 



C c 2 property, 



* Mr. Hume has in a note on the fixth feftion of his Enquiry concerning Human 

 Underftanding, propofed a middle clafs of arguments, which he calls proofs, meaning 

 fuch arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or oppofition. This 

 diftin£lion may, as he fays, conform our language more to common life ; but fuch argu- 

 ments philofophically confidered are only of the higheft degree of probability, and arc 

 ranked as fuch by Locke. 



