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ever, as in the material, fo in the intelledlual world, fuch obfer- 

 vations of the connexion of effeds are of confiderable impor- 

 tance. Though we cannot penetrate the efTence of the mind, and 

 difcover how it thinks, we may learn many ufeful lefTons with 

 regard to the condud; of our underftandings and the regulation 

 of our paffions ; as in the material world we may difcover me- 

 thods of rendering the powers of nature fubfervient to our con- 

 venience, whilft their manner of operating is wholly unknown. 



Had attention been given to this diftindion we might perhaps 

 have efcaped the intricate inquiries for which metaphyfics have 

 been fo diftinguifhed. The queftions concerning matter and fpirit 

 and human liberty appear to belong to the clafs of inquiries 

 into the nature of caufes or their manner of operating, which 

 baffle the reftlefs curiofity of human fpeculation. Perhaps, how- 

 ever, this obfervation may be retorted, and it may be faid that 

 Dodor Prieftley, who has lately revived them, has fufficiently 

 fhewn that thofe fubjeds do not lie beyond our comprehenfion. 

 It will, therefore, be neceffary to aflign reafons for the purpofe of 

 proving the arguments alleged by Dodor Prieftley to be incon- 

 clufive. 



To his argument, in proof of the Materiality of the Soul, I will 

 content myfelf with oppgfing Berkeley's argument in favour of 

 Spirit. Such is our ignorance of caufes that we are incapable of 

 difcovering any effential diftindion amongft them. If we begin 

 by acknowledging Matter, we are led by the ordinary rules of 



reafoning 



