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reafoning to conclude with Dodor Priefiley, that all caufes are ma- 

 terial. If we begin by acknowledging Spirit, we are led to con- 

 clude with Berkeley, that all caufes are fpiritual or immaterial. 

 Nor let it be thought that thefe two metaphyficians, fetting out 

 from different points, meet in one conclufion. Dodor Prieftley 

 does indeed exclude Solidity from his idea of Body ; but this, 

 however it may facilitate convidion, by removing the objedion 

 of the fuppofed imcompatibility of folidity and thought, as pro- 

 perties of the fame fubftance, does not by any means appear 

 effential to his argument. Befides, he afcribes efficiency to beings 

 incapable of thought, and to thinking beings he afcribes other 

 powers befides that of thinking or fuggefting ideas^ 



With regard to the queflion of Human Liberty, Dodor Priefl- 

 ley's argument appears to refl intirely upon the mere fuppofition 

 of the truth of a principle the oppofite to that which I have 

 endeavoured to eflablifli, namely, that the fubjed is within the 

 reach of the human underffanding ; fmce he fupports the dodrine 

 of necefTity only by the impofTibility of maintaining that of 

 free-agency. If this fhould appear to be the ftate of the argu- 

 ment, it cannot be ufed to prove that very fuppofition. 



In the fecond fedion of his Illuftrations of Philofophical Ne- 

 ceflity, he fays, that to evade the force of his great argument 

 of caufe and effed, it is faid, " that though in a given ftate of 

 " mind two different determinations may take place, neither of 

 '• them can be faid to be without a fufficient caufe; for that 

 " in this cafe the caufe is the mind itfelf^ which makes the deter- 

 *' mination in a manner independent of all motives." This, 



which 



