[209] 



which Dodor Prieftiey introduces as an argument ufed to evade 



the force of reafoning by which the dodrine of philofophical 



neceffity had been maintained, is really the ftatement of the 



opinion of thofe who embrace the dodrine of free-agency; and 



until it fiiall have been overturned no decifive progrefs can 



have been made in the eftablifliment of the oppofite dodrine. 



On this point then the whole queftion turns. What is Dodor 



Frieftley's anfwer? " That the mind itfelf, independent of the 



" influence of every thing that comes under the defcription of 



" motive, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, 



" cannot poffibly be confldered as a caufe with refped to either 



" of them in preference to the other; becaufe, exclufive of what 



" may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable dif- 



" ference in the circumflances immediately preceding the deter- 



" minations. Every thing tending to produce the leaft degree 



" of inclination to one of the determinations more than the 



'• other muft make a difference in the ftate of ^mind with refped 



" to them, which by the ftating of the cafe is exprefsly ex- 



" eluded ; and I ivill venture to fay that no per/on, let hrs bias in 



" favour of a fyfiem be ever fo great, will chife to fay in fupport 



" of it that the mind can poffbly take one of two determinations 



" without having for it fame thing that may at lea/i be called an 



" inclina,tion for it in preference to the other -^ and that inclination, 



" or whatever ejfe it be called, muft have had a caufe producing 



" it in fome previous affedion of the mind.' \ will not, indeed, 



chufe to fay that the mind can take one of two determinations 



without being it,relf determined by fome preceding circ.umftance, 



becaufe I will not chufe to affume the queftion of the freedom 



of the will; but I do not fee that, becaufe I decline to affume 



Vol. V. D d the 



