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the truth of one fide of this qneftion, Dodor Prieflley ia there- 

 fore authorized to aflume the oppofite. This argument of caufe 

 and efFedt is, he fays, the great and mojl conclujive argiime?it for 

 his dodrine. To what does it amount ? The queftion is fairly 

 ftated, and if in this dark and doubtful conteft no metaphyfician 

 boldly maintains the dodrinc of free-agency, the vidory of phi- 

 lofophical neceffity is at once proclaimtd. Were the enquiry 

 commenfuratc to the human underflanding this would be a fair 

 appeal to the common fenfe of mankind ; but I have already 

 affigned a general reafon for thinking that all enquiries into caufcs 

 are beyond our comprehenfion. 



It may poflibly be thought that this is an enquiry only into 

 the conne6lion of caufes and efFeds, fince it only propofes to 

 determine whether the operation of moral caufes is necefTary or 

 contingent, and that it therefore is reducible to the clafs of thofe 

 in which probability is attainable ; but the argument of Dodor 

 Prieftley is derived from a general confideration of the nature of 

 the human mind, and not from any experimental obfervation of 

 fads. Not that I think fuch obfervation could fupport his fyftem-, 

 even though it were certain that man is a free-agent, he could 

 not have any experimental proof of his freedom, fince he could 

 not know by experience that he could in any inllance have aded 

 in a manner different from that in which he then chofe to ad. 

 Since therefore a free-agent could not by experience difcover his 

 freedom, it cannot be proved from experience that a being ads 

 neceffarily. Experience muft in both cafes be the fame, and 

 therefore cannot eftablifh the truth of either. 



Mr. 



