[ 2'3 ] 



think, clearly refuted ; but he has not ftated it in the fame man- 

 ner with Dodor Prieftley. He fuppofes that when a number of 

 motives are prefent to the mind, each fliould, if the dodrine of 

 Neceffity were true, have its determined effed, and he fliews that 

 the refults arifing from tlieir combinations would not be fuch as 

 are obferved to happen. In page 600 he fays, " let the manner ■ 

 •" of the conjmiaion of caufe and effedt in phyfics be fuppofed as 

 «' difterent as poffible from the mafiner of the conjutiaion of mo- 

 '' tive and adion ; only let the conjundion in both relations be 

 " conjiant, and the whole of my reafoning from the dilemma and 

 " axioms to the laft inference muft remain unfliaken, and all my 

 «' conckifions will be found fuch as may be tried experimentally." 

 If then this be not fuppofed by the advocates of Neceffity, the 

 -reafoning of this writer is by his own conceffion without foun- 

 dation. It, I think, appears from Dodor Prieftley's treatife, that 

 he regarded all the confiderations prefent to the mind as forming 

 one motive, and that to this colledive view he attributed the 

 neceffary determination of the will. The queftion, therefore, 

 on which he argues is, whether the mind can, in the fame 

 combination of circumftances, form different determinations, 

 whilft the queftion on which Dodor Gregory argues is, whether 

 it is not abfurd to conceive that in every combination each dif- 

 tind confideration fhould be conneded with a correfponding 

 effed. That Dodor Prieftley did not confider each diftind mo- 

 tive as conneded with its correfponding adion, will, I think, ap-.- 

 pear from the following paffages. 



In 



