[ 2 14 ] 



"In the lirft ftclion of his (reatife on the dotlrine of Ncceffity he 

 flates his opinion in thefe words ; " I maintain that there is fome 

 " fixed bw of nature refpeding the will as well as the other 

 " powers of the mind, and every thing elfe in the conflitution of 

 " nature; and confequently, that it is never determined without 

 " fome real or apparent caufe foreign to itfclf, i. e. without fome 

 " motive of choice, or that motives influence us in fome definite 

 " or invariable manner, fo that every volition or choice is conjicintly 

 " regulated and determined by what precedes it; and this conllant 

 " determination of mind, according to the motives prefenlcd to 

 " it, is all that I mean by its neceffary determination." And in 

 the fixth fefiion he fays, " If we always choofe that obiedl or 

 " that adion, which, on whatever account, appears preferable at 

 " the moment of making the choice, it will always be determined 

 " by fome invariable rule depending tipon the flate of the mind 

 " and the ideas prefcnt to it ; and it will never be equally in our 

 " power to choofe two thing!, ivhen all the previous circumjlances 

 " are the very fame!' In the fecond fection he fays, that " to 

 ^' eftablifh the conclufion defined in the preceding fedion, nothing 

 " is neceffary but that, throughout all nature, the fame confe- 

 " quences fhould invariably refuhy/'o/w the fame circumjlances. For, 

 " if this be admitted, it will neceffarily follow, that at the com- 

 " mencement of any fyftem, fince the feveral parts of it, and 

 " their refpedive fituations, were appointed by the Deity, the firft 

 " change would take place according to a certain rule efiabliflied 

 " by himfelf, the refult of which would be a new ftuation ; after 

 " which, the fame laws continuing, another change would fuc- 

 " cecd, according to the fame rules, and fo on for ever ; every neiv 



" fituation 



