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'•'• fittiatlon invariably leading to another^ and every event, from the 

 " commencement to the termination of the fyftem, being ftridly 

 " connetSlcd ; fo that, unlefs the fundamental laws of the fyftem 

 " were changed, it would he impoflible that any event fhould 

 " have been otherwife than it was." In the fame fedtion he ex- 

 prefsly calls the coUedive view of all the confiderations fug- 

 gefted to the mind the motive. " In every determination of 

 " mind, or in cafes where volition or choice is concerned, all the 

 " previous circumftances to be confidered are, the ftate of mind 

 " (including every thing belonging to the will itfelf) and the views 

 " of things prefented to it ; the latter of which is generally called 

 " the motive^ though under this Term fame writers comprehend them 

 " both." And he expreffes himfelf in the fame manner in the 

 following page : " A particular determination of mind could not 

 '* have been otherwife than it was, if the laws of nature refped- 

 " ing the mind be fuch as that the fame determination fhall con- 

 " flantly follow the fame fate of mind and the fame views of things" 

 And in the fourth fedion he fays, " whenever any perfon makes 

 " a choice, or comes to any refolution, there are two circum- 

 '• ftances which are evidently concerned in it, viz. what we call 

 " the previous difpofition of the mind with refped to love or 

 " hatred; for example, approbation or difapprobation of certain- 

 " objeds, &c. and the ideas of external objeds then prefent to 

 " the mind, that is, the view of the objeSls which the choice or 

 " refolution refpeds." Dodor Gregory, as the refult of his argu- 

 ment, has determined, that a motive is not a phyfical caufe im^ - 

 pelling a man to ad, but that for the fake of "which a man ads ; 



and 



