[ 2.6 ] 



•and confulered lliis as the diflindion between the do^uines of 



Nisceffity and Liberty ; but Doctor Prieftley has fpokcn of it as 



a diftindion wholly unimportant, according to his notion of Ne- 



ceffity. In the fccond fedion he fays. " No lefs fallacious is it to 



" fay that motives do not impel or determine a man to a6l; but 



" that a man, f^'om the view of the motives, determines himfelf 



" to ad." And in the fourth fedion he fays, " Every volition is 



" nothing more than a defire, viz. a dejire to accompli/h fame end^ 



" which end may be confidered as the objed of the paffion or 



" affedion." In the following words he has guarded againft any 



miftake which might arife from his comparifon of the mind to a 



balance. " It is acknowledged that the mechanifm of the balance 



' is of one kind and that of the mind of another, and therefore 



' it may be convenient to denominate them by different words ; 



' as for inftance, that of the balance may be termed a pliyjical, 



' and that of the mind a moral mechanifm. But flill if there be 



' a real mechanifm in both cafes, fo that there can be only one 



' rejult from the fame previous circumflances, there will be a real 



'; neceflity, enforcing an abfolute certainty in the event." 



Mr. Hume has not expreffed himfelf with fo much clearnefs 

 as Dodor Prieftley ; but his ambiguity renders his opinion equally 

 fecure from the attacks of Dodor Gregory, fincc his cxpreffions 

 are at leaft equally applicable to the opinion of Dodor Prieftley as 

 to that which Dodor Gregory has controverted. In'hisEffay on 

 Liberty and Ncceffity he. fays, tl^at the inferences concerning hur 

 man adions " are founded on the experienced union of like ac- 



" tions 



