[ 219 1 



exped Its ufual attendant, and to believe that it will exift. In 

 anfwering this argument all that is necelTary is to produce that 

 medium which he declared paffed his apprehenfion. It, I think, 

 confifts of two propofitions. The former is that thofe things -^htch 

 begin to exiji have not an independent exijience ; the latter, thofe 

 things which do not exlji of themjelves, or independently, mujl derive 

 their exi/ience from fame other things. Thefe two abftrad princi- 

 ples are to me felf-evident. Perpetuity of exi/lence is infeparably 

 conneaed with Neceffity of exijience , and the notion ol' derived 

 exijience is infeparably connetled with the notion of that which is 

 not necejjary. The former is the principle of the firft propofition, 

 the latter of the fecond. We muft therefore acknowledge that 

 every thing which begins to exift has derived its exiftence from 

 fome other being as its caufe. This has, indeed, been acknow- 

 ledged by Mr. Hume himfelf. " It is," he fays, " univerfally 

 " allowed that nothing exifts without a caufe of its exiftence." 



Ignorant as we are of the nature of caufes, we are, indeed, 

 unable to determine whether all EfFeds fhould be afcribed imme- 

 diately to the firft caufe ; or whether, by the appointment of that 

 firft caufe, there has been eftabliOied a connedion between cre- 

 ated things. On the latter fuppofition we might conclude that 

 there is a real conneaion, where we have obferved an uniform con- 

 junaion ; but even on the firft we are authorized to infer the pro- 

 bability of a fimilar conjundion of effeds in fimilar cafes yet 

 unobferved by us. It is agreeable to the opinion, that all things 

 derive their exiftence immediately from one great author, to be- 

 lieve that there ftiould be a fimplicity and uniformity in this 



continued fyftem of creation. 



E e 2 *■"*' 



