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.^ The probability of any particular inference on either fuppo- 

 lition will be proportioned to what we conceive to be the extent 

 of our obfervation of the analogies of nature. Mr. Hume has 

 faid, that if any intricate or profound argument be produced, it 

 is in a manner giving up the queftion, becaufe it fhould be obvious 

 to the capacity of an infant ; but, though the former fuppofilion 

 be indeed too profound, the latter has no abftrufenefs, except 

 what it derives from the abftrad form in which it has been pro. 

 pofed ; and other maxims, which, expreffed abftradedly, would 

 be as difficult to an infant, are yet readily admitted in their ap- 

 plication. It would not be eafy to convince an infant that the 

 whole is greater than a part, and yet he would not find any 

 difficulty in a particular inftance. But if after even this abate- 

 ment it fhould ftill be thought too difficult, there is not any 

 reafon why we fhould not fuppofe that the infant is influenced 

 by the acknowledged principle of the afTociation of ideas ; and 

 that what in him is afTociation is in the man aflbciation correded 

 and ftrengthened by reafoning. 



This clafs, which has for its objed the connedion of caufes and 

 cfFeds, evidently contains all the enquiries of natural philofophy ; 

 and what has been faid under the firft head of the divifion has, 

 I fuppofe, made it appear that morality is alfo comprifed within 

 it. It remains to be fhewn that it includes thofe propofitions 

 which are fupported by the evidence of teftimony, or which relate 

 to the computations of chance. 



All 



