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and one not likely to meet ready acceptance on the firft pro- 

 pofal, employs himfelt' to limit its extent fo as to fecurc to 

 it a more favovirable reception ; while Clarke prefaces his main 

 argument by proving, from the defign of religion and the 

 faculties of man, that perfedl and irrefiflible evidence on thefe 

 points is not to be expedled. 



Atterbury on his firfl head of proof eftabliflies that fuch 

 a meflage as that in the text fent to a wicked man would 

 not be complied with — that he would doubt of its reality, and 

 find ovit natural modes of accounting for it — that he would 

 fuppofe it fome dream of a melancholy fancy, or fome trick 

 of his unbelieving acquaintance — and that even if he fliould 

 receive it at firft as a revefcition, the progrefs of time would 

 take away his horror, and the raillery of his companions laugh 

 him out of his perfuafion. On his fecond head of proof he 

 then argues that the evidence fpecified is in reality a lefs 

 probable or powerful means of convicftlon than the adlual 

 evidence of the gofpel— becaufe the gofpel evidence contains 

 refvirredlions from the dead, with many other proofs — becaufe 

 the evidence required exerts all its force on the firfl impref- 

 fion, after which it is ever afterwards in a declining flate, 

 whereas that which is given gains ground by degrees, and the 

 more it is confidered the more it is approved — and laflly, 

 becaufe the force of the motive in the one cafe is particular 

 and confined within a fmgle breafl, whereas the other is an 

 univerfal flanding proof, tried and approved by men of all 



defcriptions, 



