. [ ^59 ] 



Lastly, That fallacious as all experimental reafoning may be, 

 yet the violations of the laws of nature (the exiflence of which 

 laws can be known and inferred only from experience") cannot 

 be rendered credible in any cafe by any human teftimony 

 whatfoever. 



On each of thefc affertions I mean, with the indulgence of the- 

 Academy, to make a few obfervations. 



Section I. 



Of the Necefity of Caufes. 



JMr. Hume, in the 3d fedion of the firft book of his Treatife 

 on Human Nature acknowledges, " it is a general maxim in phi- 

 '' lofophy that whatever begins to exijl mufi have a caufe of exiji- 

 " ence; this is commonly taken for granted, being fuppofed to 

 " be founded on intuition," but if examined, he tells us " it 

 " will be found to difcover no mark of intuitive certainty ; for 

 *' this fpecies of certainty arifes from the difcovery of fuch re- 

 " lations as are unalterable fo long as the ideas continue the fame, 

 " thefe are refemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees 

 " of any quality, and contrariety ; none of which are implied in this 

 " propofition, whatever has a beginning has aljo a caufe of exift- 

 " ence\ it is not therefore intuitively certain, at leaft whoever 



" afferts 



