[ i6o ] 



" afTerts it to be fo, muft deny thefe to be the only infallible 

 " relations, and muft find fome other relation of that kind im- 

 *' plied in it*. 



" We can never demonftrate the neceffity of a caufe to every 



" new exiftence or modification of exiftence, without fhewing 



*' the impoflibility that any thing can ever begin to exift with- 



" out a producftive caufe ; now that this is utterly incapable of 



" a demonftratiye proof we may fatisfy ourfelves by confidering, 



" that as the ideas of caufe and efFedt are evidently diftindl, it 



" Vv'ill be eafy for us to conceive any objedl to be non-exiftent 



" this moment and exiflent the next, without conjoining to it 



" the diflindl idea of a caufe or productive principle. The fe~ 



" paration therefore of the idea of a caufe, from chat of a 



" beginning of exiftence, is plainly poflible for the imagination, 



' and confequently the adual feparation of thefe objedls is 



" fo far poflible that it implies no contradiction nor abfurdity, 



" and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reafoning 



^- from mere ideas, without which it is impofEble to demonftrate 



" the neceffity of a caufe." 



To mc, however, the propofition alluded to, namely, /bat 

 whatever begins, to exift muji have a caufe of its cxifence, conveys 



intuitive 



* In quoting Mr. Hume I do not always fcrupulonffy adhere to his expreffions ; 

 I endeavour to abridge, alvsfays retaining his fenfe. 



