I 



[ i6i ] 



intuitive certainty, a certainty not grounded on the relations he 

 mentions, but on that of caufation implied in the very terma of 

 which that propofition confiltsj for the beginning of exiftence or 

 the tranfition from non exiftence to exiftence is evidently a change 

 from nothing to fomething ; now a change of any kind implies 

 an adtion of fome being or other, as it enters into the definition 

 t>f an adion, an adion being fuch a difpofition of a being as that 

 a change refults from it. But it cannot be the aflion of the being 

 that begins to exift, as is evident : it muft therefore be the adlion 

 of fome other being. Now a being from whofe adlion the exift^- 

 ence of another being refults, is what is denominated its cuufe : the 

 relation of caufatioa is therefore included in it, and infeparable 

 from the conception of beginning exiftence. 



In this argument the demonflration refts on the relation of 

 caufation neceffarily refulting from the confideration of begin- 

 ning exiftence ; but an argument equally forcible will be found 

 to arife from the confideration of another circumftance contained 

 in Mr. Hume's objedlion to the intuitive certainty of the pro- 

 pofition in queftion. 



He tells u« that, " as the ideas of caufe and effe(fl are evi- 

 '"' dently diftindt, it will be eafy for us to conceive any object 

 " non-exiftent this moment, and exiflent the next, without con- 

 " joining to it the diftindt idea of a caufe or produdlive prin- 

 " ciple. The feparation therefore of the idea of a caufe from 



Vol. VIII. X ' '♦ that 



