[ X62 ] 



'• that of beginning exiftence is plainly poffible for the ima- 

 '• gination." — Now I defy Mr. Hume or any one elfe to imagine 

 an objed as non-exifting He may imagine one that does not 

 exift, as a golden mountain and a thoufand other objeds that 

 imply no contradidion, and judge them not to exift, but he 

 cannot /W^/wf them but asexilling; their reprefentation in the 

 imagination is jufl: the fame whether judged to exift or not to 

 exift. To imagine an objecfl as no7i-exifling, if it means any 

 thing, fignifies to have no imagination at all of it. This over- 

 fight is fo much the more remarkable, as he himfelf juftly ob- 

 ferves*, that the imagination barely copies or tranfpofes the copies 

 of fenfible imprelfions ; now a nonexifting objeift, as fuch, can 

 furely make no fenfible imprellion. Jt is however true that we 

 can conceive an objecft, and judge it not to exift this moment 

 and to exift in the next ; but during the moment of its non- 

 exiftence, it muft be fuppofed pojfible^ that is, that a power 

 exifls fomewhere of bringing it into exiftence ; this is implied 

 in the very notion of poffibility. Reference to a caufe is therefore 

 implied in that notion and cannot be feparated from it. 



Mr. Hl'Me may perhaps reply that his notion of the poffibi- 

 lity of an objedl includes no more than the compatibility of the 

 attributes of that objedt — yet fomething more is evidently ne- 

 ceflary to arrive at the ftate of exiftence, otherwife all objeds 



whofe 



• P. 318 of the Edition in 4to. 



