[ 172 ] 



convinced of the thinking principle within us, of which we alfo 

 have only a notion and not an idea. Mr. Hume need not fearch 

 for its fource, for it evidently arifes from refledion, an operation 

 very different from jconfcioufnefs, with which he confounds it in 

 arguing againft this origin, p. 319, &c. 



Section IV. 



Of the Nature of Belief. 



Mr. Hume's opinion refpedting the nature oi belief is as Angular 

 as any of the opinions we have already examined, and though of 

 much lefs importance than thofe, yet it may not be amifs to take 

 fome notice of it ; premifing that by belief he does not mean the 

 mere perfuafion of any truth upon the credit of teftimony, and 

 of which we have no perfonal knowledge, but the perfuafion that 

 any objed whatfoever will be followed by any other as its efFedt. 



To explain the nature of belief, he tells us, p. 310, " that hav- 

 *' ing found in many inftances that any two kinds of objects, as 

 " flame and heat, fnow and cold, have always been conjoined to- 

 " gether, if either be prefented anew to our fenfes, the mind is 

 " carried by cuftom to exped heat or cold, and to believe that fuch 

 " a quality does exift, and will difcover itfelf on a nearer ap- 

 " proach." " This belief," he adds, " confifls in iomt fentiment or 



" fding. 



