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" feeling, which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded 

 " at pleafure." Here he confounds the inftindivc impulfe by 

 which we are induced to judge that thefe objeds will be conjoined, 

 or that one fenfation will be followed by another, with the judg- 

 ment that arifes from that impulfe, and which alfo accompanies it, 

 and may be called a fort of fentiment or feeling. By reafon of its 

 accompanying the judgment, both are, when they refped a future 

 event, denoted by one word, namely, expeElation. But with re- 

 gard to pqft events, the fentiment is particularly attended to as 

 accompanying the judgment, and, li Jiendy, it is called confidence 

 or qffurance, and both it and the judgment taken together are 

 called certainty ; and if unjieady and wavering in the higheft degree, 

 they are called doubt or heftation; or if the fluduation be lefs 

 confiderable, probability. Our author, however, thinks that this 

 fentiment comprehends the whole of what we call belief. To 

 define it he allows to be a difficult, if not an impoffible tafk, 

 but thinks it not improper to attempt a defcription of it, evi- 

 dently for the purpofe of (hewing that belief is not grounded 

 on reafon, but a mere blind inftind. " Belief (he &ys) is 

 " nothing but a more vivid conception of an objed than what 

 " the imagination' alone is ever able to attain :" forgetting that 

 to be the very defcription he had already given of a fenfation 

 or imprejfwn, p. 289, where he tells us " there is a confidera- 

 " ble difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a 

 " man feels the pain of heat, and afterwards recals to his me- 



*' mory 



