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*' mory this fenfation, or anticipates it by his imagination ; thefe 

 " faculties may copy the perceptions of the fenfes, but never can 

 " reach entirely the force and vivacity of the original fentiment ;" 

 and p. 290, " by the term tmprejjion, I mean all our more lively 

 " impreffions, when w^e hear, fee, or feel, or love, or hate, or 

 " defire, or will." Now the conception of an objedl is not an 

 emotion like love or hate, but muft be either what he calls 

 an impreffion of fenfation, or an idea ; and he exprefsly tells 

 us that the conception, which he calls belief, is ftronger and 

 more vigorous than any idea, therefore it muft be a fenfation, 

 and this it evidently is not ; his account is therefore faulty. 



Add to this that beHef neceflarily implies the conjunction 

 of two objeds, and therefore cannot be confined to the con- 

 ception of one only ; of this our author himfelf feems to have 

 had a glimpfe, for p. 311, he tells us, " that belief is fome- 

 " what felt by the mind, which diftinguiflies ideas of judgment 

 " from the fidions of imagination." He felt then that judgment 

 was fomehow involved in belief; but an idea of judgment is 

 an expreflion both inconfiftent with his own definition of ideas, 

 and in this cafe appears to me unintelligible. 



Sectioi 



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