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clulion very different from that deduced by Mr. Hume. It 

 appeared to me that the arguments advanced in that efTay were in- 

 compatible with fo many uncontrovertible truths, that their 

 falfehood might be varioufly demonftrated by various perfons ; 

 and as mathematical problems daily receive various folutions 

 without implying the infufficiency of the foregoing, fo the 

 artificial difguifes of error may be varioufly detedted by feveral, 

 and with equal fuccefs. Emboldened by thefe confiderations 

 I alfo ventvire on this field of difputation, on which I engage 

 our common adverfary in a method fomewhat different from 

 that followed by others, namely, by purfuing him ftep by 

 ftcp. 



This mode of refutation, though apparently the mofl: dired 

 and appofite, is however, fometimes expofed to this inconveni- 

 ence, that when general fourcei of fallacy or error are widely 

 fcattered through a declamatory performance, fuch ai that I now 

 confider, it is not eafy to feleiSl the particular paffages beft fuited 

 for their detedlion. This difficulty I mean to obviate by 

 Hating the moft prominent of each kind in preliminary re- 

 marks. 



1°. A CONSTANT fallacy lurks in our author's application 

 of the term experience; fometimes he applies it to our own 

 paft or adual experience of which we have a metaphyfical 

 certainty ; fometimes to that of others only, and not our own, 



of 



