57 



men may find, or promife to themfelves from the propagation of aa 

 untruth. As children and novices are thus prone to belief, we find, 

 alfo, that the principle of credulity is more ftrong in rude and unpolifticd 

 nations, who ftill remain nearer to a ftate of nature than among thofe 

 people, who have attained to a greater pitch of refinement. All this 

 may ferve to convince us, that credulity is an innate principle. In fpeaking 

 here of the principle of credulity, and confidering it, as innate, I fpcak only, 

 with a reference to the popular and inftinftive kind of faith or belief, 

 which every man feels within himfelf, and which is the chief fpring 

 of aftion, in the common tranfaftions of life. There is another kind 

 of faith or aflent more fedate and elaborate in kind, which muft be 

 diflinguilhed from this, which I call credulity. 



Credulity is inftinftive and inftantaneous, the other kind of faith technical 

 and progreffive. Credulity feems to be the child of feeling, the other fpecies 

 the work of intelleft. Credulity occurs every day, every hour. It attends 

 the mod common propofitions. It takes place, in the mofl: ordinary occur- 

 rences of life. The other kind of faith appears, in the gradual yielding, and 

 chaftifed aflent of the mind, to preponderating evidence, whether wc 

 decide on controverted points of hiftory, and contefted fafts in juridical 

 proceedings, or yield to the conviftion, that accompanies the truths of 

 religion. The one, as I have faid, predominates from nature ; and its 

 force and degree depend on the temper and feelings of each perfon ; 

 the other on his underftanding the degree of his fagacity, and the per- 

 feftion of his reafoning powers. In this, however, they agree, that 

 the prevalence or abfence of the one and the other will be regulated 

 in a great meafure, by the education, the habits, the fociety, the pur- 

 fuits, and courfe of ftudy of the individual. The firfl: lies «within the 

 province of morality, fliould be regulated by law and rules, is to be 

 reflraio^ed like other paffions or propenfities, and is addreft by motives ; 

 the other belongs to logic and metaphyfics, is independent of motives, 

 and capable of flrift demonftration. The negleft of diftinguiftiing fuf- 

 ficiently between two principles of aflent, fo different in themfelves, 

 mud be produftive of confiderable obfcurity and confufion. It fhould 



Vol. IX. ( H ) be 



