33 



CHAP. IV. 



Of the Pleasures and Pains arising frofn Affectibility. 



82. Affcctibilitij, considered as a distinct, source of plea- 

 sure or pain, has not, as I conceive, been hitherto sufficiently 

 attended to; hence it is necessary I should explain the no- 

 tion I form of it. 



83. By affectibility then, I understand, that capacity, or 

 passive property of the mind that renders it susceptible of 

 pleasures and pains, distinct and different from those inhe- 

 rent in the perceptions of the senses, memory, imagination, 

 understanding, or moral sense, though constantly preceding 

 or following each of them. 



84. Thus, suppose a man pinched with hunger, to have 

 food set before him ; he is rejoiced. This joy is a pleasure 

 surely distinct and different from the satisfaction of his ap- 

 petite, or the taste of his food. 



8o. Again, suppose his food suddenly snatched from him, 

 he is vexed, and this vexation is a pain very different from that 

 of hunger, or nnsatiated appetite. 



VOL. XI. P o« C 



F So. {suppose 



